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NOTES
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ARBITRATION
AWARDS IN GRIEVANCES INVOLVING
DISCRIMINATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes over discriminatory employment practices have tra-
ditionally been settled privately between the contracting parties,
the employer and the employee, although the latter could seek the
support of his bargaining representative. In the United States, how-
ever, such disputes must be viewed against a background of a na-
tional labor policy which, because of the deleterious effect on the
public interest of labor unrest, places a premium on statutory and
judicial regulation of the employment relationship. The impact
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' exemplifies the latent
conflict between statutory regulation of labor disputes and their
settlement through private mechanisms.
Title VII provides the employee who alleges that he has been
victimized by discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or
national origin with a remedy against his employer that operates
entirely apart from the grievance settlement mechanisms estab-
lished by the collective bargaining agreement. A party who wishes
to invoke Title VII must file a complaint with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which alleges a violation
of the rights guaranteed therein. Where the state in which the
charge is filed has legislation prohibiting discriminatory employ-
ment practices, the EEOC may not act until either the state pro-
ceedings have terminated or sixty days have elapsed since their
commencement; where no such legislation exists, the charge must
be filed with the EEOC within ninety days of the allegedly dis-
criminatory action.
If the investigation by the EEOC discloses "reasonable cause"
to accept the veracity of the charge, it will first attempt to elim-
inate the discriminatory practice through conciliaion and confer-
ence.2 Should the EEOC be unable to secure voluntary compliance,
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-16(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970). as
amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 104 (March 24, 1972).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Publ. No. 88-352, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259.
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it may, within thirty days, bring a civil action against any respon-
dent who is not a government, governmental agency, or political
subdivision thereof. If, after thirty days, the EEOC has initiated
no action, the aggrieved party has ninety days in which to sue on
his own behalf.3 Upon finding a violation of Title VII, a federal
district court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in the un-
lawful practice and order appropriate affirmative relief, such as
reinstatement with back pay.4
Despite the existence of this federal remedy, the employee
may seek to redress a discriminatory employment practice through
the grievance adjustment mechanism that has been established by
the collective bargaining agreement. In the vast majority of con-
tracts, such a mechanism provides for arbitration as the final step.
If, however, arbitration produces a decision which is unsatisfac-
tory to the employee, he may attempt to relitigate substantially
similar issues in federal court via an EEOC complaint. In such a
case, controversy surrounds the extent to which the arbitral and
judicial processes are duplicative. Nonetheless, the potential for
relitigation cannot be denied.
The principle purpose of this note is to consider whether the
employee who has submitted to arbitration an employment prac-
tice that is violative of Title VII, should be estopped from there-
after seeking relief from the same practice in federal court. The
propriety of an arbitrator relying on federal law - specifically
Title VII - which has not been expressly incorporated into the col-
lective bargaining agreement will be examined. Finally, criteria
palatable to both arbitrators and judges will be suggested against
which the arbitration of a discriminatory employment practice can
be tested to ascertain whether or not the grievance has been so
fully heard as to preclude access to the federal courts.
II. JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ON ELECTION OF REME-
DIES
Based on the decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals,"
and in the absence of a clear expression by the Supreme Court,5
3. Act of March 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 706 (f) (1), 86 Stat. 105, amendi-ng
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970). The complainant is permitted to intervene in the suit
by the EEOC. Should he sue on his own behalf, the court may, within Its discretion, ap-
point an attorney to represent him and authorize the action to be commenced without
the payment of security or fees.
4. Id. at § 706(g).
5. Bowe V. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Hutchings v. United
States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970'); oontra Dewey v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), a/I'd 402 U.S. 689 (1971). See Comment, Labor Arbi-
tration and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 10 DUQ. L. RLV. 461 (1972).
6. The Dewey case was affirmed by an equally divided court, Dewey v. Reynolds Metal
Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
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the majority view is that submission of a discriminatory employ-
ment practice to arbiration does not constitute a binding election
of remedies or an estoppel which would preclude the grievant from
seeking relief in federal court under Title VII.
In Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. 7 the plaintiffs, present or
former female employees of defendant company, brought suit un-
der Title VII alleging discriminatory lay-offs under a segregated
seniority system based on sex. Prior to trial, the district court re-
quired the plaintiffs to elect whether they would proceed before it
or submit their grievance to arbitration under the prevailing col-
lective bargaining agreement. The court of appeals found this re-
quirement to be erroneous.
The concurrent jurisdiction between the arbitrator and the
court was conceded. The court went on the find, however, that:
The analogy to labor disputes involving concurrent juris-
diction of the N.L.R.B. and the arbitration process is not
merely compelling, we hold it conclusive. 8
Although the court agreed that permitting relitigation saddled the
defendant employer with the burden of defending in multiple
forums, it discovered a more weighty countervailing policy in the
distinctions between arbitration and judicial proceedings:
[T]he arbitrator may consider himself bound to apply
the contract and not give the types of remedy which are
available under the statute. Conversely, an action in court
may not be able to delve into all the ramifications of the
contract nor afford some types of relief available through
arbitration, e.g., back pay prior to the date of the statute.9
Moreover, the court pointed out that in a Title VII action the
charging party acted under the mantle of the sovereign as a pri-
vate attorney general. Hence, it contended, the trial court bore a
responsibility in the public interest to resolve the dispute regard-
less of the position of the individual plaintiff. However, the court
limited its holding, acknowledging that dual relief would be in-
appropriate where:
7. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
8. Id. at 714. The authorities which the court cites generally state that the arbi-
trator cannot deprive the Board of Its statutory jurisdiction. See, e.g., Carey v. Westing-
house Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
9. Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1969). As the enact-
ment of Title VII becomes more distant, an award of back pay prior to the date of the
statute seems increasingly remote.
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[E]lection of remedy was made after adjudication so as to
preclude duplicate relief which would result in an unjust
enrichment or windfall. .... 10
After a similar, but more detailed analysis, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the same result in Hutchings
v. United States Industries, Inc.1 Hutchings, a black, brought an
action under Title VII wherein he alleged that his employer had
twice refused to promote him because of his race. The district
court granted the company's motion for a summary judgment. It
reasoned that by pursuing the alleged discriminatory denial of pro-
motion to final determination through the plant's grievance-arbi-
tration procedures, Hutchings had made a binding election of rem-
edies.
In articulating the basis for its reversal, the court started from
the premise that since Title VII was silent as to the role of griev-
ance arbitration in the settlement of discriminatory employment
practices, "the task of discerning 'legislative intent' rests upon
the sound application of judicial principles and precedents.' 12 The
court noted that, insofar as the EEOC was limited to seeking vol-
untary compliance, the federal courts alone held the true enforce-
ment power, and were vested by Title VII with broad discretion
to frame the appropriate relief. 3 The pronouncements of the Bowe
court were echoed as to both the distinctive rights and remedies
of arbitration, and the duty of the trial court to reach beyond the
demands of the private litigant to vindicate the policies of Title VII.
The court's principal concern was that the limitations which
the parties' agreement placed on the role of the arbitrator precluded
a full and fair hearing on the discrimination grievance. It adopted
the language of the United States Supreme Court in United Steel-
workers of America v. Enterprise Wheel Car Corp.
14
[An arbitrator is confined to interpretation and ap-
plication of the collective bargaining agreement; he does
not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He
may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet
his award, is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbi-
10. Id.
11. Hutchlngs v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970).
12. Id. at 311.
13. Id. at 311-13. Before the 1972 amendments, the EEOC could not bring an action
on the complainant's behalf. However, the amendments do not defeat the validity of the
court's observations. Even though currently the EEOC may bring an. action, it still has
no enforcement power until it has prevailed in a judicial proceeding.
14. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
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trator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts
have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.15
The court believed that even where the contract contained an anti-
discrimination clause, the arbitrator would not give the types of
remedies available under Title VII. It observed that because a
union member would naturally first seek to vindicate his rights
under the contract, he should not be penalized through the doctrine
of election of remedies or res judicata.'6 In conclusion, the court
stated:
We do not mean to imply that employer obligations hav-
ing their origin in Title VII are not to be incorporated into
the arbitral process. . . .But the arbitrator's determination
under the contract has no effect upon the court's power to
adjudicate a violation of Title VII rights.
17
The court in Hutchings also acknowledged the inapplicability
of its holding to a situation where duplicate relief would result in
unjust enrichment or a windfall. Its most significant addition to
the analysis contained in Bowe concerned the effect of deficiencies
in the record on the decision to defer to the arbitrator's award:
The arbitrator, for example, did not purport to apply [Title
VII] rights to the problem submitted (it does not appear
whether the issue was raised), and the record does not show
does not show what evidence he considered or the pro-
cedures that were followed. In view of the state of this record,
we leave for the future 'the question whether a procedure
similar to that applied by the Labor Board in deferring
to arbitration awards when certain standards are met might
properly be adopted in Title VII cases. 18
The significance of this qualification, as a basis for reconciling
the split among the circuits, especially when viewed in light of the
Sixth Circuit's retreat from the position that arbitration precludes
further proceedings, cannot be exaggerated. Regretably, the court
supplied no authority from which such standards could be directly
inferred.
Several lower federal courts have adopted the view that arbi-
tration does not preclude a subsequent Title VII suit based on the
15. Id. at 597.
16. Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 313 (7th Cir. 1970). The
court acknowledged that the award could be considered as evidence.
17. Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 313 (7th Cir. 1970),
citing Local No. 12 v. Cameron Iron Works, 257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958), wherein, it was
held that arbitration could not erode the statutory jurisdiction of the Board.
18. Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 314 n.10 (7th Cfr. 1970).
Compare Newman v. Avco Corp. Aerospace St. Div., 451 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1971).
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same transaction. For example, in Page v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.19
the court concluded that the arbitrator had limited himself to a
narrower issue than that which was before it. Mack v. General
Electric Co. 2 0 involved a grievance which had been settled be-
fore arbitration. This less formal termination was held not to pre-
vent additional relief in federal court. The court in Salinas v. G.
W. Murphy Industries, Inc.21 pointed out two deficiencies in the
arbitration process: first, that it lacked guarantees of procedural
due process; and, second, that the union might have countervail-
ing interests to those of the grievant, especially where he is a
member of a racial minority.2 2 These factors were found to negate
the function of arbitration as an adequate hearing of the discrimina-
tion grievance.
The analyses of two other federal district courts involved greater
sophistication. In Lopez v. State Foundry & Mach., Inc.,28 settle-
ment of the discrimination claim under state law was held not to
bar a federal action on the same ground because the state law
failed to allow for an award of back pay. The court commented:
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act affimatively encour-
ages voluntary settlement or settlement under state law. It
would be inappropriate to hold that the pursuit of state
remedies or the settlement of state law claims would result
in a waiver of federal claims per se, for such a rule could
only chill what the Act ends to encourage.2
It should be noted that the court in Hutchings seemed hard-
pressed to argue around Title VII's endorsement or private dis-
pute settlement. By a parity of reasoning, the discussion in Lopez
suggests that deference to arbitration awards may deter full util-
ization of that process.
In Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp.2 5 the complain-
ant had been awarded back pay with removal of warnings from
his record at arbitration. The court found that the limitation in
the Bowe opinion to situations which did not involve duplicative
relief compelled dismissal of the Title VII action for mootness. It
stated:
19. Page v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1060 (D.N.J. 1971).
20. Mack v. General Electric Co., 329 F. Supp. 72, 78 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
21. Salinas v. G. W. Murphy Indus., Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
22. See Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
HARv. L. Rv. 1109; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
23. Lopez v. State Foundry & Mach., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Wisc. 1972).
24. Id. at 37.
25. Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1033 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
NoTEs
The settlement of the grievances accepted by the plain-
tiff provided the plaintiff with all the relief to which he
could be considered entitled ....26
This rationale would permit a defendant to prevail through summary
judgment by showing that the grievant had been awarded ade-
quate relief in arbitration. Notably, by focusing on the result of
arbitration, the moving party would not have to assert that the
mere submission of the grievance to arbitration precluded subse-
quent court action.
Although the minority position, that submission of a discrimin-
atory employment practice to arbitration estops the grievant from
subsequently filing a Title VII suit, is best represented by the
Sixth Circuit's holding in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company,
27
brief mention must be made of unappealed pre-Dewey district court
decisions. In Washington v. Aerojet General Corp.,28 after the
union and the company, with the concurrence of the plaintiff, had
agreed to reduce a one month disciplinary lay-off to nine days, the
plaintiff brought a Title VII action. The company moved to dis-
miss on the theory that the private settlement constituted a binding
election of remedies. While granting the motion, the court never-
theless expressed distaste for the requirement of an ad initio elec-
tion of forum which had been articulated by the district court in
the Bowe case:
Because of the time limits under the civil rights legislation,
the charging party will often be forced to initiate civil rights
proceedings with the State or Federal agency or the Fed-
eral courts at precisely the same time that he is seeking to
enforce his contractual rights under the collective bargar-
ing agreement.
2 9
Rather, the binding election rule was applied at the point where
the "litigant has pursued his remedies in one forum to decision,
be it by settlement, the decision of an arbitrator, or the decision
of a judge." 80
Similarly, in Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp., 1
the plaintiff had cashed a check which represented the amount of a
settlement for loss of pay during his suspension. By emphasizing
that acceptance of the settlement constituted a binding election,
26. Id. at 1038.
27. Dewey v. Reynold Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324. (6th Cir. 1970), aft'd 402 U.S. 689
(1971).
28. Washington v. Aerojet Gen- Cori., 282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
29. Id. at 522.
30. Id. at 523.
$1. Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
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the court followed Washington in departing from the ad initio elec-
tion rule. Some criticism of the minority view has focused on the
concept of an ad initio binding election which is arguably objec-
tionable because the employee may initiate a grievance before he
becomes aware of his Title VII rights. Hence, despite the subse-
quent litigation at the appellate court level, these decisions
remain significant in that they demonstrate a minority view
based on the finality of prior settlement rather than an ad initio
election.
The Dewey case involved religious, rather than racial, discrim-
nation. In a Title VII suit seeking back pay and reinstatement,
the complainant alleged that his discharge for refusal to work over-
time on the Sabbath constituted an unlawful constraint on his
religious beliefs. In the arbitration of the grievance relief was denied.
The district court refused to grant Reynolds' motion to dismiss,
which was based, inter alia, on election of remedies.
The Sixth Circuit's reversal of the lower court was predicated
primarily on the Supreme Court's elevation of arbitration to a posi-
tion of primacy in national labor policy. The court cited the United
Steelworkers trilogy32 for the proposition that, had the arbitrator's
award favored Dewey, it would have been, "final, binding and
conclusive on Reynolds."3 The court ruled that, the parties had
selected a mutually agreeable arbitrator, he should have the right
to finally determine the grievance. It stated:
Any other construction would bring about the result pre-
sent in the instant case, namely, that the employer, but not
the employee, is bound by arbitration.
This result could sound the death knell to arbitration....
. ..Employers would not be inclined to agree to arbitration
clauses in collective bargaining agreements if they provided
only a one way street, i.e., that the awards are binding on
them but not on their employees.3 4
In denying a petition for rehearing, the court elaborated upon
this theme by referring to Boys Market, Inc.'v. Retail Clerks Union. 5
The court pointedly stated that the rule pronounced in the Hutchings
case was inconsistent with the spirit of Boys Market. The court
observed that in Boys Market the Supreme Court permitted no
32. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
33. Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324, 331 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd 402 U.S.
689 (1971).
34. Id. at 332.
85. Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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strike clauses, which had been exchanged for mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses, to be specifically enforced because the previous rule,
allowing enforcement of the arbitration clause only by the union,
was found to deter the use of arbitration. In contrasting the facts
before it with those in Boys Market, where the strike had preceded
even an attempt to arbitrate, the court commented:
Our case is even stronger than Boys Market because
the grievance here was submitted to arbitration and the
arbitrator made an award which was final, binding and
conclusive on the parties.
36
In assessing the precedential weight of Dewey, two points merit
particular mention. First, the court discussed the effect of the ar-
bitration as a bar only after a lengthy attack on the merits of the
district court's conclusion that the discharge constituted religious
discrimination. Second, the court never characterized its ruling as
based on an election of remedies, nor did it mention the treatment
of that doctrine by the Seventh Circuit in the Bowe case.
The significance of the rule pronounced in Dewey arises not
so much from its genesis as from its evolution. In Spann v. Kay-
wood Division, Joanna Western Mills Co.,3 7 plaintiff, a black, had
been discharged because he had asked two white, female co-
workers for dates. Despite having been reinstated by the arbitrator,
he brought a Title VII suit to recover back pay, which the arbi-
trator had declined to award.
Spann sought to avoid the Dewey rule on several grounds.
The court found that the facts of the case did not support the con-
tention that the union had failed to pursue the racial issue in ar-
bitration. Alternatively, the grievant asserted that under Glover
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. 8 and Vaca v. Sipes89 he
was not obliged to seek settlement through arbitration. Both cases
were distinguished as involving situations where the employee had
discovered, or had sound reason to suspect, that pursuit of con-
tractual remedies would be futile. Finally, Spann asserted that he
had not really pursued his remedy on the'racial discrimination
issue because the issue was outside the jurisdiction of the arbi-
trator. The court found that the arbitrator had the requisite juris-
diction based on an equal pay for equal work clause in the agree-
36. Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd 402 U.S.
689 (1971).
37. Spann v. Kaywood Div., Joanna Western Mills Co., 446 F.2d 120 .(6th Cir.
(1971).
38. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
39. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
589
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ment, and added, "[c] learly both parties to the arbitration it-
self believed this to be the case.. .,,o In conclusion, it gave
voice to a cautionary note:
We hold only that where all issues are presented to bona-
fide arbitration and no other refuge is sought until that ar-
bitration is totally complete, Dewey precludes judicial cog-
nizance of the complaint.4 1
Newman v. Avco Corp.-Aerospace St. Div.42 again presented the
Sixth Circuit with an opportunity to reconsider the Dewey case.
There, plaintiff, a black employee with fourteen years tenure, was
transferred to a new position as a stove lifter when his department
was reduced. He was discharged for inefficiency after a short per-
iod on the new job. Newman filed a grievance:
[C]ontend[ing] that the past practices of the company
in failing to give blacks adequate training had caused his
inability to perform jobs other than Stove Lifter, to which
he might have been transfered when his department was
reduced.4
3
When the union informed Newman that it would not allege racial
discrimination in the firing, he retained counsel to present the ra-
cial points to the arbitrator. The arbitration award was adverse to
Newman on all points. In his subsequent Title VII suit, the district
court granted Avco's motion for a summary judgment on the
ground that the arbitration constituted a binding election of remedies.
Before discussing the facts of the case, the court of appeals at
least clarified, if it did not substantially reformulate, its holding in
Dewey. The court first expressed general distaste for the election
of remedies rule. It commented that private parties by private con-
tract could not deprive a federal court of its statutory jurisdiction
and that, furthermore, although Congress was familiar with the ar-
bitration of labor disputes, no language in Title VII supported elec-
tion of remedies. The court then declared, ". . . we do not read
Dewey as based upon the doctrine of election of remedies."" By
way of explanation the court pointed out that the doctrine applied,
"only where conflicting and inconsistent remedies are sought on
the basis of conflicting and inconsistent rights."'15 It then reasoned
that the doctrine could not have been applied in Dewey because
40. Spann v. Kaywood Div., Joanna Western Mills Co., 446 F.2d 120, 123 (6th
Cir. 1971).
41. Id,
42. Newman v. Arco Corp.-Aerospace St. Div., 451 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1971).
43. Id. at 745.
44. Id. at 746.
45. Id. at 74.6 n.1. The court went on to characterize the election doctrine as "harsh"
590
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not only had the same facts been presentec to both the court and
the arbitrator, but the remedies sought had been complementary.
From this analysis it concluded:
[I]t seems apparent that the second ground relied on
for the decision in Dewey was the doctrine of estoppel.
This equitable doctrine holds that where the parties have
agreed to resolve their grievances before 1) a fair and im-
partial tribunal 2) which had power to decide them, a Dis-
trict Court should defer to the fact finding thus accomp-
lished.
48
In applying this twofold test to the facts in Newman, the court
first observed that because under the collective bargaining agree-
ment failure to pursue each step of the grievance machinery to
final conclusion rendered the discharge final, the submission of the
discharge to arbitration had not been a voluntary choice. The court
also noted that the allegation of a pattern of racial discrimination
participated in by both company and union had been entirely ab-
sent in Dewey. The court concluded that the first condition for es-
toppel had not been met, stating:
This totality of circumstances appears to represent a fun-
damental attack upon the fairness and impartiality of the
arbitration proceeding and specifically to represent an alle-
gation of bad faith against defendant union.
47
Furthermore, the court felt that grave doubt existed as to the
arbitrator's authority to finally decide a racial discrimination claim.
It noted both the absence of an anti-discrimination clause in the
contract and a narrow provision restricting the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator to "questions involving the interpretation, application or
alleged violation ' 4 8 of the terms of the agreement. The arbitrator
was also prohibited from adding to, subtracting from or changing
any of the agreement's terms.4 9 Hence, the court stated:
In short, major aspects of this District Court complaint
were either not submitted to arbitration or were beyond the
arbitrator's power of decision. To such issues plainly neither
the doctrine of res judicata nor collateral estoppel can ap-
ply.50
and "largely obsolete", citing Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U.S. 207, 213 (1918).
46. Newman v. Arco Corp.-Aerospace St. Div., 4,51 F.2d 743, 747 (6th Mr. 1971).
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Although the presence of some of these contentions in the Spann
case was conceded, it was distinguished because the grievant had
accepted the award:
Equitable *considerations under the doctrine of estoppel ar-
gue strongly against allowing a litigant to make full use of
arbitration up to the point of acceptance of the award (re-
instatement to his job) and then permitting him to sue in
another forum for the back pay which the arbitrator de-
nied.5 1
The disposition of the Sixth Circuit toward the suggestion in
Hutchings of a standard for judicial deference to arbitration paral-
leling that adopted by the NLRB for the same purpose is im-
possible to ascertain with certainty. However, it is submitted that
not only has the Sixth Circuit expressed favorable sentiment toward
the creation of such a standard, but its opinions permit the infer-
ence of the most crucial criterion around which a deference stand-
ard must be constructed.
In Spann, the court argues that the facts support deference to
arbitration when viewed in light of a test suggested by the com-
mentators. 2 More significantly, the court distinguishes Dewey from
Newman on the basis of the full evidentiary record present in the
former case, as contrasted with the skeletal record in the latter
case which was decided by summary judgment. Within this context,
the crux of Newman is not the union's bad faith, because insofar
as the grievant was represented by his own attorney, he could not
have been prejudiced thereby. Rather, the crucial point is the court's
uncertainty as to the scope of the arbitrator's inquiry. The court
notes that, in response to the grievant's allegation that an anglo
who had performed as poorly had been transferred instead of fired,
the arbitrator explained that the transfer had been requested by
the foreman of the transferee department. The court then observed:
This seems to ignore plaintiff's underlying position that he
could not perform other chores well because due to racial
discrimination, he had never been so trained, but in any
event, the arbitration award denied relief to plaintiff. 53
The court is thus uncertain as to whether the arbitrator failed
to consider the grievance in the context of the company's alleged
51. d. at 749.
52. Spann v. Keywood Division, Joanna Western Mills Co., 446 F.2d 120, 123 n.3;
citing Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of Arbitraion Under
TrrLn VII, 69 MICH. I REv. 599, 651 (1971).
53. Newman v. Arco Corp. St. Dlv., 451 F.2d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1971).
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history of racial discrimination, or considered the issue, but reject-
ed it for a failure of proof. Such uncertainty must of necessity be
determinative of a court's refusal to defer to an arbitration award.
At first glance the election of remedies versus estoppel distinction
may appear far removed from the policies of either civil rights or
labor peace. However, the doctrine of estoppel is the more flexible.
Hence, especially as it was applied in Newman, the latter doctrine
provides the court with a rationale for investigating the arbitration
procedure to determine the fullness of the hearing given to the
Title VII issues.
Neither subsequent pronouncements by the Sixth Circuit nor the
applications of its decisions by the district courts serves to eluci-
date the staus of the minority view. In Thomas v. Phillip Carey
Manufacturing Co., 54 the Sixth Circuit, with minimal discussion,
held that the Spann case was controlling and expressly refused to
overrule it. Thomas involved a suit for back pay which the arbi-
trator's award of reinstatement had not included, and was hence
factually indistinguishable from Spann.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 5 5 the court, after quoting
at length from both Hutchings and Dewey, found the superior ar-
gument to lie in the deleterious effect of multiple litigation upon
arbitration. In holding that the employee was bound by the award,
however, it observed that although no express reference to Title
VII rights appeared therein, the affidavit of the grievant indicated
that racial discrimination had been asserted before the arbitrator.
In Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 56 the court expressly attempted to
synthesize the rule of Dewey with the Hutchings dictum on a
standard for judicial deference. After discussing both cases, the
court followed Dewey, but explained its conclusion by pointing out
that the arbitrator had considered the same issues which were be-
fore the court. Hence, both of these cases may be read as estab-
lishing the existence of a record which demonstrates that the ar-
bitrator considered Title VII rights as a condition precedent to de-
ferring to his award.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE
ELECTION OF REMEDY CASES
A. THE POLICY OF THE NLRB IN DEFERRING TO ARBITRATION
It will be remembered that the court in Hutchings explored the
possibility of developing a standard for judicial deference to arbi-
54. Thomas x. Phillip Carey Mfg. Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971).
55. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972).
56. Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 332 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
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tration awards in Title VII cases similar to that developed by the
Board to handle questions of concurrent jurisdiction with arbitrators.
The Board first articulated such a standard in Spielberg Manufac-
turing Co. 57 In upholding an arbitration award which refused to re-
instate grievants discharged for alleged strike misconduct, the
Board stated:
In summary, the proceedings appear to have been fair and
regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the de-
cision of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to
the purposes and policies of the act. In these circumstances
we believe that the desireable objective of encouraging the
voluntary settlement of labor disputes will best be served
by our recognition of the arbitrator's award.6 8
Similarly, the Board in International Harvester Co. 59 deferred to
an arbitration award which reinstated an employee discharged for
falling behind in union dues as of the expiration of the contract,
but with a resulting loss of seniority. The Board articulated the
rationale for deference in these words:
If complete effectuation of the federal policy is to be
achieved, we firmly believe that the Board, which is en-
trusted with the administration of one of the many facets
of national labor policy, should give hospitable acceptance
to the arbitral process as "part and parcel of the collective
bargaining process itself...."80
The Board stated that deference would be inappropriate only where
"it clearly appears that the arbitration proceedings were tainted by
fraud, collusion, unfairness, or serious procedural irregularities,"
or where the award was "palpably wrong." '61 In closing it further
bolstered an already weighty decision on behalf of deference; "To
require more of the Board would mean substituting the Board's
judgment for that of the arbitrator, thereby defeating the purposes
of the Act. .... "162
However, insofar as International Harvester constitutes the high
water mark of Board deference to arbitration, the Board has since
steadily retreated from that position. For example, in Westinghouse
57. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 10,80 (1955).
58. Id. at 1082.
59. International Harvester Co., 138 NLRB 923 (1962), aff'd Rarnsey v. NLRB, 327
F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
60. Id. at 927.
61. Id. at 927-29.
62. Id. at 929. This language echoes the position of the Steelworkers trilogy on the
substitution of judicial for anhidral judgment.
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Electric Corp.,68 the Board did not defer to the arbitrator's settle-
ment of a pretext discharge, stating:
In this case apparently not all the evidence concerning
[the Board's] standards was available to the arbitrator,
S. . and his award reflects this deficiency.... Consequently,
while we give some consideration to the award, we do not
think it would effectuate statutory policy to defer to it en-
tirely."
More recent Board pronouncements on deference to arbitration
demonstrate a continued erosion of the Spielberg doctrine as suggest-
ed in Westinghouse. Two pretext discharge cases in which the
Board refused to defer to the arbitrator's award are illustrative.
In Montgomery Ward & Co. 5 it was stated:
[W]e are not satisfied that the statutory issue of discri-
minatory discharge had been either raised or resolved in
the arbitration proceeding. 68
In the same vein is Yourga Trucking Inc.67 There the Board re-
fused to accept the arbitrator's determination as conclusive because
the party who alleged the award as a bar failed to meet the
burden of proving that the alleged improper motive for the dis-
charge had been argued during the arbitration.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the rhetoric of def-
erence was never thoroughly implemented in practice. A study of
cases which presented the Board with the opportunity to defer to
an arbitration award concluded:
Even in the heydey of the deference doctrine between 1960
and 1964, the Board in fact deferred in only about 23 per
cent of the cases in which the issue of arbitration was dis-
cussed. . . . Moreover, under the crucial test of what the
Board has done in practice, the proportion of the cases in
which the Board has deferred to arbitration has fallen from
23 per cent to 12 per cent of the cases in which the def-
erence issue was discussed during the period 1965-67. 68
In summary, the position of the NLRB on the question of def-
erence to arbitration cannot be accepted as indicating an overall
rule either demanding or prohibiting deference by the judiciary. As
63. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 162 NLRB 768 (1967).
64. Id. at 771.
65. Montgomery Ward & Co., 195 NLRB No. 136, 79 LRRM 1505 (1972).
66. Id. at 1506.
67. Yourga Trucklng Inc., 197 NLRB No. 130, 80 LRRM 1498 (1972).
68. Note, The 1NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J. 1191, 1193 (1368)
(footnotes omitted).
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the Board has acknowledged, arbitration is currently an integral
part of national labor policy. However, the Board has also recog-
nized other policies which would be frustrated if an arbitration award
in which they might never have been considered were permitted to
finally dispose of the controversy. In addition, an award that is re-
pugnant to Title VII, even if it results from a full and fair hear-
ing, should not stand.
It is submitted that the courts could best profit from the Board's
treatment of the concurrent jurisdiction problem by developing a
deference standard against which the facts of each case could be
measured. The principal criterion would entail a demonstration
that the arbitrator had been presented with evidence and arguments
on the same issues that were being asserted before the alternative
forum. The Board's policy of forcing the party who urges a prior
adjudication as a bar to shoulder the burden of proving this issue
seems appropriate for courts as well. Nor should the Board's con-
cern with minimal procedural fairness be ignored.
Such a development would not be without support from the cases
previously discussed. That the Hutchings dictum is directly in point
cannot be disputed. More significantly, the Sixth Circuit applied just
such criteria in refusing to find an estoppel in the Newman case.
First, it expressed concern that the arbitrator had not considered
the Title VII issue, or at least observed that the record did not
permit the inference that he had. Second, the court weighed the
misconduct of the bargaining agent, if not its overt collusion with
the employer, and concluded that the fundamental fairness of the
arbitration had been so badly eroded as to preclude the basis for
an estoppel.
B. A COMPARISON OF THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION
WITH THOSE AVAILABLE IN A TITLE VII SUIT
In their opinions permitting the relitigation of a discrimination
grievance under Title VII, despite its having been the subject of
final arbitration, both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits asserted a dis-
parity between the relief which an arbitrator could award and the
relief which would be available from a federal district court in a
suit brought under Title VII. According to Title VII:
[TJhe court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirma-
tive action as may be appropriate, which may include, but
is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with
or without back pay. 9
69. Act of March 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 706 (g) 86 Stat. 105, amending 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970).
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The section goes on to allow for the deduction from back pay of
interim earnings. Section 706 (k) of the Act permits the court in its
discretion to award attorney fees and costs. And, under the 1972
amendments, where the action is not brought by the EEOC, the
court may appoint an attorney for the complainant. The power of
a court to award affirmative relief in the form of hiring new em-
ployees is beyond the scope of this note, which assumes the griev-
ant to be an employee. With that reservation, Title VII does not
appear to contemplate the granting of any relief which would be
outside the power of an arbitrator.
It is not disputed that an arbitrator may award damages in the
form of back pay; because the employee must mitigate his loss,
such damages are purely compensatory in nature.7 0
In upholding the power of the arbitrator to issue awards which
involve a sanction not specifically provided for in the contract,
courts have created a presumption in favor of such arbitral author-
ity. For example, in reversing a district court which had ordered
arbitration but had precluded the awarding of damages, the Fifth
Circuit stated:
[W]e find no such positive declaration as would exclude
from the arbitrators the power to determine whether the
award of back pay is or is not within the terms of the agree-
ment, and if so, whether it is or is not an appropriate rem-
edy. 71
Similarly, in Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. International Chemi-
cal Workers Local 187, AFL-CIO 72 plaintiff sought to vacate an
award of back pay due employees whom the company had compelled
to observe Memorial Day on May 29 rather than May 30. The
court refused to grant relief, stating:
[I]n order to deny the Arbitrator power to fashion an ap-
propriate remedy for breach of the collective agreement, we
must find clearly restrictive language negating the Arbitra-
tor's power to fashion a remedy. . .7
70. ELKOURT, FRANK & EDNA, How ARBITRATION WORKS (1960) (citing numerous
awards) [hereinafter cited as ELKQRI]. Arbitrator W. Willard Wirtz hasl emphasized
that arbitrators have authority to award money damages even though the contract does
not specifically provide such remedy. To restrict arbitrators to remedies specifically set
forth In the contract would negate arbitration as a method of dispute settlement or
would result in cluttering contracts with numerous liquidated damages provisions which
would invite more trouble than they could prevent. Id. at 336-37.
71. International Assn. of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 292 F.2d 112, 119
(5th Cir. 1961) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied 368 U.S. 926 (1961).
72. Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. International Chem. Workers, Local 187,
AFL-CIO, 200 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. La. 1961).
73. Id. at 528.
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In contrast to compensatory damages, an arbitration award
of punitive damages is clearly not favored.' 4 However, in advocating
the use of punitive damages, one arbitrator has argued:
Public policy seeks the maintenance of labor peace, recog-
nizing that industrial warfare is harmful to the greater pub-
lic interest. Surely then, any tool or process that can be
used to attain that goal is in the public interest, and its use
should be encouraged.75
Although conceding that under current standards such an award
would be improper absent contractual authorization, the commentator
suggests the assessing of costs as a viable substitute. It should be
noted that Title VII contains no provision authorizing punitive dam-
ages; furthermore, no case was found in which such damages were
awarded.
The remedy of reinstatement, a command in the form of a man-
datory injunction, is as common to arbitration as it is to Title VII
suits. While arbitrators seldom characterize their awards as injunc-
tions, it has been observed:
In contrast to the infrequency of awards which prohibit
a party from carrying out some specific future act, awards
in the nature of "mandatory injunctions" which command a
party to take some affirmative action, such as an award or-
dering the employer to reinstate an employee, are common
in arbitration.
7 6
Finally, the 1972 amendments to Title VII concerning the power
of the court to appoint an attorney to represent the complainant
have a parallel not in the power of the arbitrator, but in the griev-
ance mechanism itself. It is the indisputable duty of the bargaining
agent to represent the grievant. The consistency with which unions
discharge this duty with regard to employees who belong to minority
groups has not escaped challenge. However, as a justification for re-
fusing to defer to arbitration, a court would be ill-advised to dis-
pense with the effectiveness of the arbitration process because the
grievant must depend on the good faith of the bargaining represent-
74. ELKOURI, supra note 70, at 237.
75. S. Wolff, The Power of the Arbitrator to Make Monetar Awards, LABOR AR BITRA-
TION-PERSPECTIVES AND PROBLEMS 176, 188 (1963). Compare Thorsen Mfg. Co., 44 LA 1049
(Koven, 1965) (no damages awarded where axnount of overtime lost through erroneous
work assignment was speculative because damages would be punitive in nature with
Ralph Rogers & Co., 67-1 ARB P 8059 (Getman, 1966) (Company forced to pay costs of
arbitration where its failure to clarify the basis for its decision to the union caused the
grievance to be filed).
76. ELKovu, eupra note 70, at 171,
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ative without an analysis of the facts of the controversy such as
that which appears in the Newman case.
C. PRONOUNCEMENTS BY THE SUPREME COURT ON THE ROLE
OF ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
In the Labor-Management Relations Act Congress expressly stat-
ed that "final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties
is . . . the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collec-
tive bargaining agreement."' 77 It was not until 1957, however, that
the United States Supreme Court elevated arbitration to a position
of primacy in national labor policy. Then, in Textile Workers Union
of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama7s the Court upheld a suit
under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act to enforce
.an agreement to arbitrate. The rise of arbitration at the hands of
the Court continued through the Steelworkers trilogy,7 9 wherein the
Court ruled that a grievance, despite its apparently frivolous nature,
was presumptively arbitrable. This line of cases culminated in Boys
Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770.80 There, the parties'
agreement contained a no strike clause as the quid pro quo of a
mandatory arbitration clause. Without submitting the dispute to ar-
bitration, union members walked off ohe job. Despite the express
prohibition against labor injunctions contained in section 7 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Supreme Court upheld an injunction against
the strike under section 301.
Language from the Lincoln Mills line of cases has been used
by both sides of the controversy over judicial deference to the ar-
bitration of discriminatory employment practices. The Sixth Circuit
in Dewey relied on an analogy to Boys Market, where the Court
felt compelled to provide management with a remedy against viola-
tion of the no strike clause because the union could enforce the
agreement to arbitrate. By a parity of reasoning, it was felt that
without judicial deference to arbitration, that process became a sim-
ilarly impermissable one way street. On the other hand, the court
in Hutchings quoted language from the Steelworkers trilogy that the
arbitrator does not sit to "dispense his own brand of industrial jus-
77. Labor Management Relations Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964).
78. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448
(1957).
79. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
597 (1960).
80. Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 389 U.S. 235 (1970).
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tice."8 1 Because this so limited the scope of the arbitrator's inquiry,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that a full hearing necessitated relitiga-
tion in federal court.
The most significant evidence of the Court's position on the def-
erence question is its treatment of the Dewey case, which was its
only opportunity to address the issue. The case was affirmed by an
equally divided Court . 2 Sifting through the dicta of the section 301
cases reveals, as the circuits have recognized, ammunition for both
sides. The Court has stated:
Arbitration is a stabilizing influence only as it serves as a
vehicle for handling any and all disputes that arise under the
agreement.
8 3
This passage, while not cited in any of the deference cases,
suggests that the Court would frown on a bifurcated settlement pro-
cess where discrimination disputes were routinely absent from arbi-
tration. Furthermore, the Court's characterization of labor arbitra-
tion as "at the very heart of the system of industrial self-govern-
ment 4 suggests that factors having a delterious effect upon arbi-
tration will likewise significantly disrupt national labor policy on a
broad level.
In contrast, even stronger language limiting the arbitrator to the
four corners of the collective bargaining agreement can be found in
the Enterprise Wheel case than the passage which appeared in the
Hutchings opinion. Commenting on the arbitrator's decision to award
back pay beyond the expiration date of the agreement, which had
expired during the arbitration, the Court said:
It may be read as based solely upon the arbitrator's view
of the requirements of enacted legislation, which would mean
that he exceeded the scope of the submission. 5
Yet another case in the trilogy contains seemingly contradictory
dicta:
The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to
the express provisions of the contract, as the industrial com-
mon law-the practices of the industry and the shop-is equal-
81. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
581-82 (1960).
82. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
84. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
581 (1960) (emphasis added).
85. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960).
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ly a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not
expressed in it. . . .The parties expect that his judgment of
a particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract
says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement per-
mits, such factors as the effect upon productivity of a par-
ticular result, its consequences to the morale of the shop, his
judgment whether tensions will be heightened or diminish-
ed.
6
An attempt to reconcile these varying dicta seems not only doom-
ed to failure, but also to be mere speculation in view of the manner
in which Dewey split the Court. However, it would be a mistake
to ignore the thrust of the section 301 cases: that labor arbitration
has reached such a position of primacy as a tool of national labor
policy as to justify abandonment of the prohibition against labor in-
junctions contained in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The conclusion is
inescapable that the solution most commensurate with the pronounce-
ments of the Court is not an all-encompassing rule for or against
deference, but rather a rule that maximizes the role of arbitration
in the dispute settlement process by avoiding the injury to arbitra-
tion which may inhere in either extreme.
A test which determines, on a case-by-case basis, whether the
arbitrator considered the evidence and issues necessary to a full
hearing of the Title VII aspects of the grievance would preserve the
maximum impact for arbitration on dispute settlements. Management
could not object to the inclusion of a mandatory arbitration clause
on the ground that the award would not bind the civil rights griev-
ant. Conversely, grievants would have no reason to routinely avoid
arbitration because they would be bound by the award only if it
could be shown that their Title VII charges had received a full and
fair hearing.
It must be emphasized that the impetus given to arbitration in
the Lincoln Mills line of cases never exceeded the expectations of
the parties. In each instance, the parties had contracted for the man-
datory arbitration clause which was being enforced. A policy of def-
erence built around criteria of a full and fair hearing would not
frustrate this self-determination aspect of arbitration. If the parties
believed relitigation to be in their best interests, they could insure
that a court would not defer to an award issued under their collec-
tive bargaining agreement by expressly precluding the arbitrator
from consideraing evidence on certain enumerated statutory issues.
Such an award could not then ever meet the full and fair hearing
criterion.
86. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
581-82 (1960).
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D. THE GRIEVANT'S CONTROL OVER THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
The court in Newman gave considerable weight to the charge
that the union had presented the employee's grievance in a perfunc-
tory manner. The possibility that a judicial policy of deference might
enshrine an award that has been contrived by the bargaining repre-
sentative to the prejudice of the grievant has drawn harsh criticism
from many commentators.
Illustrative of this difficulty is Vaca v. Sipes."7 Plaintiff, a union
member, sued the national and local unions under section 301 over
an allegedly arbitrary refusal to carry his grievance to the final
step of arbitration. In dictum, the Court conceded that an employee
could seek judicial enforcement of his contractual rights where the
union not only had sole power to invoke the higher steps of the
grievance procedure, but also to deprive the employee of his con-
tractual remedies by wrongfully refusing to process the grievance.
In sharp contrast, the Court's treatment of the case on its merits
showed little sympathy for the employee who had been bargained
under the table by his union. In rejecting the contention that the
employee had an absolute right to have his grievance taken to ar-
bitration, the Court stated that the union would be found to have
breached its duty of fair representation only upon a showing of ar-
bitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct. The Court felt that any
other result would so impinge upon the union's discretion to settle
grievances short of arbitration that the grievance mechanism would
collapse under the burden of carrying each and every dispute to
arbitration. It stated:
For if a union's decision that a particular grievance lacks
sufficient merit to justify arbitration would constitute a
breach of the duty of fair representation because a judge
or jury later found the grievance meritorious, the union's in-
centive to settle such grievances short of arbitration would be
seriously reduced. The dampening effect on the entire griev-
ance procedure of this reduction of the union's freedom to
settle claims in good faith would surely be substantial.
88
The unarticulated concern is, of course, the hostility of the union
to a member of a racial minority. Arbitrator Gould, writing in the
Pennsylvania Law Review, alleges:
In the case of discriminatory grievances, all of the factors in-
dicate that the parties view minority group members as a
87. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
88. Id. at 192-93.
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disruptive intrusion into what might otherwise be a smooth-
working bilateral arrangement.8 9
He continues his indictment of the racism present in the grievance
mechanism by asserting:
First, it is obvious that the aggrieved worker or group
cannot expect to obtain-an objective evaluation of the issue
in dispute if the parties who are alleged to have discrimi-
nated have control of the grievance machinery ...
Second, black workers are almost totally absent from po-
sitions of leadership in organized labor, even in unions where
their numbers are high ...
Third, . . . quite often the collective bargaining agree-
ment does not support legitimate grievances asserted by pro-
testing black workers.90
The issue of importation of federal law into a collective bargaining
agreement by the arbitrator on his own initiative will be discussed
in the following section of this paper. Nevertheless, the point of union
bias against members of racial minorities cannot be denied.
Any standard that permits, even in a limited number of cases,
the award of an arbitrator to bar a subsequent Title VII court ac-
tion must provide criteria that exposes union-management collusion
and perfunctory representation by the bargaining agent. The formu-
lation of such a standard raises a collateral question concerning the
resolution of the plight of the employee who alleges that his award
is "final" only because his union wrongfully refused to press the
grievance to the next step in the hierarchy. Initially it must be ob-
served that the employee need not submit the grievance to arbitra-
tion; no case was found which required the exhaustion of contractual
remedies as a condition precedent to bringing suit under Title
VII.21 Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. 9 2, where a Title VII
action alleging racial discrimination was brought against both the
employer and the union, is illustrative. The court held that the ex-
haustion requirement of Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox9& was in-
89. Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrtinination, 118 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 40, 49 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Gould].
90. Id. at 46-47.
91. Such cases have not escaped criticism. See, e.g., Bloch, Race Discrimination in
Industry and the Grievance Process, 21 LAB. L. J. 627 (1970) (without an exhaustion
requirement, uniform settlement routs are disruped).
92. Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 265 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ala. 1967), rev'd
on other grounds, 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969).
93. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). There the court said, "A
contrary rule . . . would deprive employer and union of the ability to establish a uniform
and exclusive method for orderly settlement of employee grievances." Id. at 653.
603.
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applicable. In reaching a similar result, the court in Reese v. At-
lantic Steel Company94 commented:
The Act sets out specifically the procedures necessary for
the institution of a civil action, and processing a grievance
through the contractual machinery is not noted as such a
condition precedent to a civil suit. 5
Hence, it could be argued that the policy which these cases assert
against exhaustion is not diminished because the grievant initiated
the grievance machinery before he decided that a federal court was
the more promising forum. Furthermore, it must be pointed out
that the ab initio election rule has not found favor since it was
pronounced by the lower court in the Bowe case. And in Spann,
the Sixth Circuit emphasized the acceptance of a final award.
Alternatively, the grievant who aborts the settlement mechanism
alleging bad faith representation by the bargaining agent may find
some solace in the Supreme Court's partial retreat from its ruling
in Vaca. In Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.96 the plaintiffs
sued both their employer and their union, alleging racially discrimi-
natory denials of promotions. The defendants pointed to plaintiffs'
failure to exhaust their contractual remedies, citing Vaca and
Maddox. The Court found for the plaintiffs, stating:
Here the complaint alleges in the clearest possible terms
that a formal effort to pursue contractual or administrative
remedies would be absolutely futile. Under these circum-
stances, the attempt to exhaust contractual remedies, requir-
ed under Maddox, is easily satisfied by petitioners' repeated
complaints to company and union officials, and no time-con-
suming formalities should be demanded of them .
7
This language would support the argument that involvement at an
early stage 'of the grievance settlement mechanism was no more
than a necessary attempt by the grievant to ascertain the quality
of represenation that the union was prepared to offer, and that
having found such quality lacking, he should be permitted to with-
draw without prejudice.
The preceding analysis is flawed in one respect: it fails to dis-
tinguish the grievant whose claim has never been fully adjudicated
because of the union's wrongful refusal to press it to a higher level
94. Reese v. Atlantic Steel Co., 282 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ga. 1967); see also ing v.
Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga- 1968).
95. Reese v. Atlantic Steel Co., 282 F. Supp. 905, 90,6 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
96. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
97. Id. at 331.
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from the grievant whose complaint lacks sufficient merit to warrant
further prosecution but who now seeks to escape the finality of that
determination through parallel relief in a federal court. This dilemma
can be avoided either by requiring the grievant to prove the defect
in the union's representation or requiring the party who urges
the award as a bar to prove that the grievant had been fairly rep-
resented.
A comparison of the policies supporting fair employment with
those behind labor arbitration suggests that the burden be placed
on the party who urges the award as a bar. The Supreme Court
described the former as, "a policy that Congress considered of the
highest priority." 98 Gould has concluded that:
While the national labor policy encouraging arbitration may
properly incorporate an election of remedies theory, public
policy against racial discrimination outweighs it.99
Furthermore, the grievant's burden of proving the represent-
ation to have been inadequate is the more weighty. The union, par-
ticularly with the cooperation of management, can easily lay a paper
trail manifesting all the outward indicia of vigorous representation.
The grievant has no control over the proceedings which would en-
able him to preserve a record of perfunctory representation. Con-
versely, the party who argues for an estoppel, be it union or manage-
ment, can create a record that evidences the adequacy of the
representation. For example, the grievant could be required to either
assert or make a written waiver of his right to be represented by
his own attorney. If he wishes to utilize the plant's grievance mec-
hanisms, he should be required to acknowledge that he is accepting
the union's efforts on his behalf and that he is aware of the possible
operation of the award as an estoppel in a subsequent proceeding.
The arbitrator could be requested to interrogate the grievant as to
the latter's satisfaction with the quality of the union's representation,
and the results of that inquiry could be made a part of the award.
Finally, in so far as the estoppel effect of an award will presum-
ably benefit the employer, forcing the employer to prove the ade-
quacy of the union's representation should minimize any collusion
between the two. Management should cooperate fully under a pro-
cedure that permits it to lay a basis for the subsequent assertion
of an award as an estoppel.
98. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968).
99. Gould, supra note 89, at 57.
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IV. THE APPLICATION OF LAW EXTRANEOUS TO THE AGREE-
MENT BY THE ARBITRATOR
As has been previously noted, the court in the Newman case
refused to hold that the arbitration award estopped further proceed-
ings because of its concern that, in the absence of an anti-discrimi-
nation clause, the arbitrator may have considered himself restricted
to the agreement and he may have ignored the impact of Title
VII on the employer's conduct. Hence, a standard for determining
judicial deference to an arbitration award must show that the arbi-
trator applied federal civil rights law in approximately the same
manner that it would be applied by a federal court in a Title VII
suit.
Where the terms of the agreement leave no doubt that the parties
intended grievances to be settled in light of pertinent federal law,
most arbitrators would feel compelled to acquiesce in the wishes
of the parties. Where, however, the agreement provides no basis
for the incorporation of federal law, the arbitrator must choose
between venturing beyond the four corners of the contract and
issuing an award which will permit, if not compel, the parties to
seek additional relief in another forum.
Although the suggestion has been made that an agreement
which does not expressly recognize Title VII rights automatically
precludes deference to an award issued thereunder, it is submitted
that such a standard would unnecessarily constrain judicial defer-
ence, possible to the detriment of the arbitration process. To reiter-
ate, the party who urges the award as an estoppel must prove the
adequacy of the hearing. Where the contract was silent on Title VII
rights, the burden would include proof not only that the legal
issues were considered by the arbitrator, but that sufficient evidence
on them had been introduced to insure a full hearing. The former
should allow for arbitral reticence; the latter for bargaining agent
under-representation. But where both have been met, it is submitted
that for purposes of barring relitigation, the award stands on equal
footing with an award entered under a contract containing an anti-
discrimination provision.
The subsequent materials examine the validity of this assertion
in view of the arbitrators' attitudes toward the application of extra-
neous law.
A. AwARDS THAT FAVOR THE INCORPORATION OF EXTRANEOUS LAW
A standard which finds support among both arbitrators who
favor activism and those who favor constraint is the clarity of
606,
NOTES
the legal issue involved. The case of Toledo Board of Educationl o is
illustratrative. There the arbitrator was forced to decide whether,
absent express legislative authorization, a school board could enter
into collective bargaining agreements with representatives of its
employees. The arbitrator stated:
It is the conviction of the arbitrator that where there is clear
and well defined law, whether it be constitutional, statutory,
ordinance or case law, that is involved in determining an
issue before him, he should apply the law in reaching his
decision. 011
Arbitrator Walsh then pushed the "clarity" standard to its limits.
After acknowledging that courts had split over the issue, he upheld
the power based on the board's authority to enter into and
terminate contracts with teachers. Similarly, in Pennsylvania Elec-
tric Company0 2 the arbitrator had to define "time worked" in order
to ascertain the propriety of awarding travel pay to employees who
participated in a training program. Arbitrator Stein held:
[S]o far as statutory meanings can be ascertained with
confidence as to their accuracy, they should be resorted to
in defining those terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment whose ultimate meaning and application are controlled
by the statute. 108
Apparently because of the authoritativeness of a statutory definition,
its inclusion in the arbitration process is highly favored. In Associ-
ated General Contractors"4 arbitrator Regester conceded that the
intent of the parties would prevail over a statute, but added that
where a contract was silent on the meaning of a term, a state or
federal statute was relevant.
Finally, the standard of clarity may also apply to the violation.
In Alsco Incorporated"°5 discharged female employees claimed jobs
held by male employees junior to them in seniority, but state law,
which had been upheld by the EEOC, restricted those jobs to males.
Although the contract made no mention of the state law, Arbitrator
Altrock found it to be controlling. He characterized arbitration
as a private procedure to which the state was not a party, but
nonetheless concluded:
100. Toledo Board of Education, 70-1 ARB P 8113 (Walsh 1969).
101. Id. at 3393 (emphasis added).
102. Pennsylvania Electric Co., 66-3 ARB P 8842 (Stein 1966).
103. 1d. at 6913.
104. Associated General Contractors, 66-3 ARB P 8973 (Regester 1966).
105. Alsco, Inc., 67-2 ARB P 8364 (Altrock 1967).
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[A] 11 applicable law must be considered as implicitly and
inferentially a part of a compact between entities existing
within and doing business under the dominion and sovereignty
of a State. . . .The labor agreement might contain a provis-
ion that the minimum hourly wage rate will be 73c. Surely
no one would contend that the statutory minimum is a dead
letter because in conflict with the will of the contracting
parties. 0 0
While to the activist arbitrator the intent of the parties may
not preclude his consideration of pertinent law, he may rely on the
parties' intent to broaden the scope of his inquiry. Weirton Steel
Company1 0 7 involved discrimination against female employees in
favor of male employees who were their juniors in seniority. Arbi-
trator Kates observed that, in 1965, the term "sex" had been
added to the contract's anti-discrimination provision. On this basis
he concluded:
[B]ecause I consider that the 1965 anti-discrimination
amendment to the labor agreement was made as a result of
the new federal law and in light thereof, I hold that I may
properly refer to that law and any regulations or decisions
thereunder in an attempt to ascertain the intent of the parties
under the new contract language. 0 8
Where the collective bargaining agreement does not contain
an anti-discrimination provision, authority to arbitrate a racial griev-
ance has been found by implication in its other terms. In National
Lead Co.109 the absence of an anti-discrimination clause did not
prevent arbitrator Wissner from hearing a charge of racial discrim-
ination. He reasoned:
Clearly, the arbitration clause ["Should any grievance arise'
under this agreement . . . ."] as stated in the contract is
very broad. Since the grievance as filed. raises the question
of qualifications to do the job as well as the issue of race,
[it is arbitrable]."'
Arbitrator Howlett, an outspoken activist, justified his reliance on
federal law which was extraneous to the contract by reference
to the parties' conduct during the hearing. He explained his accep-
106. Id. at 4308.
107. Wenton Steel Co., 68-2 ARB P 8492 (Kates 1968).
108. Id. at 4687.
109. National Lead Co., 48 LA 105 (Wissner 1967).
110. Id. at 407. See also Platt, The Relationship Between Arbitraton and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 GA. L. REv. 398 (1969), "[I]n the absence of Specific evi-
dence that the paries intended a different result. [1It would be possible for an axbitrator
to rely upon Title VII as a source of interpreting what constitutes 'Just cause.'" Id. at
405.
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tance of the union's contention that Title VII had preempted state
law limiations on the amount of overtime which female employees
could work in these words:
As Simoniz and local 559 have argued in their presentations
the legality of management's refusal to recognize grievants'
bid, I am of the opinion that, as arbitrator, I should apply
the law.""
In another case, Arbitrator Howlett applied a state fair employment
law without contractual authority. He characterized the issue of civil
rights as one of rising importance, and, citing the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, expressed the view that "An award which does not
consider the law may result in error.
'1 1 2
Another strong argument on behalf of arbitral activism is voiced
in Pennsylvania Electric Co. 11 The arbitrator relied upon a statute
to define a contract term, stating:
It seems to me improper and incorrect to define terms in
a manner plainly inconsistent with the overriding legal def-
inition, saying to the parties that what is as a matter of law
invalid is proper and correct under the collective bargaining
agreement, thus necessitating recourse to administrative
agencies and the courts .... 1
Surprisingly, no other award that incorporated extrinsic law articu-
lated this rationale.
The breadth of an activist arbitrator's exploration of extrinsic
law is illustrated in Manchester Gas Co. 1 5 The grievant, who was
not a United States citizen, had been hired despite a contract pro-
vision which required all employees to be citizens. The union attempt-
ed to enforce the contract. Arbitrator Hagan first pointed out that,
insofar as federal court enforcement of private agreements was
subject to the limitation of public policy, arbitral enforcement of
such agreements should be similarly limited. He then acknowledged
the union's contention that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendements
necessitated state action, but upheld the hiring based on the immi-
gration policy of the United States.
This survey has ignored awards which apply extraneous law
based only upon a conclusory rationale, such as the arbitrator's
111. Simoniz Co., 70-1 ARB P 8024, at 3097 (Howlett 1969).
112. Warren Consol. Schools, 67-1 ARB P 8228 (Howlett 1967).
113. Pennsylvania Electric Co., 66-3 ARB P 8842 (Stein 1966).
114. Id. at 5913 (emphasis added).
115. Manchester Gas Co., 53 LA 329 (Hagan 1969).
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concept of his duty.11 They contribute nothing to an attempt to
determine the propriety of arbitral reliance upon federal law in
general and Title VII in particular where the agreement provides
no support for such reliance. Within the context of the search
for standards, the clarity of the law test has some attraction.
Few policies have received the amount of attention from all three
branches of the national government as has equality of employment
opportunities. Furthermore, the burgeoning volume of both judicial
and administrative litigation of Title VII claims has built a vast
repository of rulings that are available to the arbitrator in his deter-
mination of the lawfulness of an employment practice. However,
precedent can so operate only if arbitrators are assumed to possess
the expertise to comprehend the nuances which lurk in the inter-
stices of the opinions. This matter of arbitral competence is con-
sidered in a subsequent section.
The remaining reasons set forth on behalf of arbitral activism
are of little value in the formulation of a standard for arbitral
application of extraneous law. For example, Arbitrator Howlett's
suggestion that he could consider an issue because the parties
had argued it, regardless of their desire that the issue not be ar-
bitrated, bespeaks of the bootstrap. Once an objecting party has
lost on a jurisdictional objection, he has no other real choice.
Similarly, any reading of an arbitration clause to embrace Title VII
issues, where, despite the extensive publicity given to equal employ-
ment problems, the contract contains no express reference to em-
ployment discrimination, seems to be at best strained. In the same
vein are arguments which analogize arbitration to judicial proceed-
ings, or bemoan the necessity of forcing the parties into another
forum. The former assumes the conclusion, that arbitration can be
equated to judicial proceedings; the latter assumes that the alter-
native forum is not the more appropriate.
In summary, arbitration awards that incorporate extraneous
law evidence a vigorous spirit of arbitral activism. However,
with the exception of the clarity standard, the varying rationales
advanced neither dispose of the general propriety of such activism
nor are especially applicable to the unique body of federal civil
rights law.
B. AwARDS THAT OPPOSE THE INCORPORATION OF EXTRA-
NEOUS LAW
Many of the expressions of constraint concerning the application
of law which is extraneous to the contract turn to the contract for
116. See, e.g., Avco Lycoming Div., 70-1 ARB p 8400 (Turkus 1970) (Title VI1
held to prevail over state law limitations on overtime hours for female employees).
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support. Western Airlines11 is illustrative. There a stewardess alleged
that her discharge because of pregnancy violated her Title VII
rights. Noting that the discharge for pregnancy clause had been
in the contract that the grievant had signed, the Adjustment Board
stated:
We are a creature of the contract with our jurisdiction or
authority limited by the terms of the Agreement which de-
prives us of jurisdiction or authority to make changes in
working conditions covered by the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.1 8
Similarly, where an arbitration board was asked to determine wheth-
er a strike had been lawful under the Railway Labor Act, it re-
sponded:
This Board is not empowered to interpret or apply the Rail-
way Labor Act. It is empowered to interpret and apply the
contract.1 19
Reliance on the contract may involve as incisive an analysis
of its language as that employed by the activist arbitrators. In
Eaton Manufacturing Co.120 female employees, regardless of their
seniority, were effectively prevented from bumping male employees
because they were assigned to the lowest rated jobs. Although
Arbitrator Kates acknowledged that Title VII was in direct conflict
with the job assignment provisions of the contract, he concluded
that the following arbitration clause precluded reference to extra-
neous law:
Should any employee feel that he has been unjustly dealt
with under the terms of this Agreement or the provisions
of this agreement violated, every effort shall be made to
settle the grievance in the following manner ...
In the event that the matter has not been satisfactorily
adjusted, the party desiring to submit the grievance involving
interpretation of the contract to arbitration shall so notify
the other party in writing.121
Arbitrator Seinsheimer, when faced with a conflict between
allegations of sexual discrimination and countercharges that female
employees could not perform the heavy work which was in dispute,
117. Western Airlines, 70-1 ARB P 8367 (Wyckoff 1970).
118. Id. at 5023.
119. Western Airlines, 71-1 ARB P 8115, at 3389 (Meiners 1970).
120. Eaton Mfg. Co., 47 LA 1045 (Kates 1966).
121. Id. at 1050. But see National Lead Co., 48 LA 105 (WiSauer 1967).
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denied the claim on the grounds that the parties had not intended
to contract for an anti-discrimination clause:
While at first it appears that the parties did not seem to
become aware of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 until early in
1966, I am sure that the parties have had access to publica-
tions and publicity concerning the Act, and I, therefore, must
assume that the 1965 contract was negotiated with knowledge
of this law, and that the past practice separating male and
female jobs was continued also with knowledge of this afore-
mentioned Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Therefore,
I must also assume that the parties continued their practice
as they must have agreed that here was a difference in cer-
tain jobs, and that certain jobs required male occupancy.
122
Insofar as the impact of fair employment legislation is becoming
more widely publicized with the passage of time, this argument
is more potent now than it was when the award was made.
The non-activist arbitrators have applied a presumption of valid-
ity to the contract to escape reconciling any conflict with pertinent
but extraneous law. In The Ingraham Co. 123 the parties had adopted
a contract creating separate male and female seniority lists shortly
before the passage of Title VII. A female employee challenged
the separate seniority. Arbitrator Yagoda dismissed the claim,
stating:
[Tihe Collective Bargaining Agreement is the joint product
of both parties. The arbitration mechanism created by the
parties to interpret and apply their commitments as ex-
pressed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement must act on
a presumption of validity of said Agreement.' 24
A like result was reached in United Air Lines.125 There the arbi-
trator refused to void a rule which resulted in the discharge of
stewardesses who married. He reasoned that until the EEOC had
passed on the consistency of the rule with Title VII, the rule carried
a presumption of validity.
The best-reasoned justification for arbitral abstention focuses on
the superior expertise of the agencies who are charged with the
enforcement of fair employment legislation. Phillips Petroleum
Company2 6 exemplifies this analysis. A female employee alleged
that repeated denials of admission to a training program were dis-
122. Pittman-M oore Div., 49 LA 709, 718 (Seinshelmre 1967).
123. The Ingraham Co., 48 LA 884 (Yagoda 1966).
124. Id. at 889.
125. United Airlines, 67-1 ARB P 8207 (Kahn 1967).
126. Phillips Petroloum Co., 0-2 ARB P 8521 (Allen 1968).
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criminatory. Although the contract prohibited sex discrimination, it
also placed the training program within the discretion of manage-
ment. Arbitrator Allen cautioned against the substitution of arbi-
tration for the statutory procedures which implement the law in
these words:
The arbitrator is not the Missouri Commission on Human
Rights and should not substitute himself in its place in terms




The arbitrator limited his inquiry to the question of whether the
grievant had been the victim of sexual discrimination. Notably,
he specifically refused to consider whether the company's overall
record was suggestive of discrimination based on sex because,
"The latter point would be infringing on the authority and power
of the Missouri Commission on Human Rights.$ 128
A similar discussion appears in The Ingraham Co. 129 Although
conceding that an arbitrator should resist upholding illegal con-
tract provisions, Arbitrator Yagoda warned against arbitrators,
"substituting themselves for the authority, expertise and procedures
which have been established by and are responsive to the statute
in implementing the law."'' 30 He continued that the arbitrator was
not the EEOC, and should not put himself in its place.
In summary, the emphasis on the contract as a barometer
which, by its silence, precludes the incorporation of extraneous law
is conclusory rather than analytical. Such expressions beg the ques-
tion by assuming that the parties are empowered to exclude federal
law pertinent to the grievance being arbitrated. As with the awards
of the activist arbitrators, the pronouncements of the non-activists
discloses only one argument which is persuasive: arbitral com-
petence. The arbitrator who settles a grievance that presents com-
plexities which are beyond his comprehension does both the parties
and the very process a two-fold disservice. Not only is the likeli-
hood of a correct determination unlikely to rise above the level
dictated by chance, but, more crucially, because the award shows
an attempt to grapple with the issues; a court may be led to
uphold it as a bar to relitigation of the discriminatory practice.
127. Id. at 4797.
128. Id.
129. The Ingraham Co., 48 LA 884 (Yagoda 1966).
130. Id. at 889. Arbitrator Yagoda considers the EEOC to have preempted the field,
and terms arbitration a "futile act." But cf. National Lead Co., 48 LA 105 (Wissner
1967), wherein Arbitrator Wissner states, "If an employee exercises a right under a statute,
the exercising of such a right does not preclude him from having a grievance filed under
a labor contract heard by an arbitrator," Id. at 407.
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Two suggestions can profitably be drawn from the non-activists
concern over arbitral competence. First, doubt as to his own abili-
ty to resolve a legal issue is an adequate ground for arbitral ab-
stention. The arbitrator who so decides should inform the parties
that he is limiting the scope of his inquiry. If this warning comes
early enough, the parties might agree to excuse the arbitrator in
the hope that his replacement would settle the dispute in its en-
tirety. Alternatively, the parties would at least be prepared for
relitigation because of the arbitrator's failure to recognize the legal
issue.
Second, where the parties suspect that the complexity of the
grievance will force the arbitrator to the frontiers of his expertise,
they should specifically set forth the legal questions in their briefs
with the request that the arbitrator give detailed consideration to
such questions in his award. Thereby, the parties might persuade
the arbitrator who has doubts about his facility in matters legal to
expressly disclaim consideration of certain issues. In addition, if
the arbitrator who has doubts about his facility in legal matters to
the award of issues which he did not understand should convince a
reviewing court of the absence of a full hearing, which would pre-
clude the finding of an estoppel. As to the party who wishes to
lay the basis for an estoppel in arbitration, a detailed discussion
that demonstrates the arbitrator's comprehension of the legal issues
should persuade the reviewing court that the full hearing require-
ment has been satisfied.
C. THE POsrrION OF THE COMMENTATORS ON THE APPLICATION OF
ExTRANEOus LAW
A theory of judicial deference to arbitration awards that pur-
port to determine Title VII rights is predicated upon the dual as-
sumptions that, in at least some discriminatory employment griev-
ances, arbitrators can and should apply pertinent federal statutes.
Both assumptions have been strenuously attacked. Arbitrator Melt-
zer precipitated a deluge of commentary when, at the 1967 annual
meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators, he urged the fol-
lowing solution for the grievance that rests upon law foreign to the
parties' agreement:
Where, however, there is an irrepressable conflict, the ar-
bitrator, in my opinion, should respect the agreement and
ignore the law."18
131. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law and Labor Arbitration, THE ARBrrxA-
TOR, THE NLRB AND THE COUMTS 16 (1967).
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He was unperturbed by the fact that while courts measure awards
against the agreement, arbitrators were denied the responsibility of
measuring agreements against the law. The practice, in his opinion,
was no more than "in each case, to confer responsibility that re-
flects the different functions being performed and the different pre-
suppositions about the competence of the different tribunals."'
' 8
As was illustrated by some of the non-activist awards previous-
ly discussed, many arbitrators justify a policy of ignoring law
which is extraneous to the agreement by asserting an obligation to
uphold the intent of the parties. In addressing the 1968 meeting of
the Academy, Arbitrator Mittenthal stated:
The very fact that the parties take the trouble to specify
the areas in which the law is to effect their relationship
suggests that they do not intend to be bound by statutory
obligations not mentioned in the contract. The typical nar-
row arbitration clause also serves to inhibit any importa-
tion of the law into the contract.3 s
He also emphasized judicial pronouncements on the relationship be-
tween law and contract, disputing their apparent support of the ac-
tivist position. For example, in 1866 the Supreme Court stated:
[T he laws which subsist at the time and place of the
making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, en-
ter into and form a part of [the contract], as if they
were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms.'"
Mittenthal observed that judges first interpret a contract, and there-
after determine its legal operation; he argued that only in the lat-
ter task is relevant law applied. More persuasively, he quoted both
Williston and Corbin as opposing the doctrine. "Indeed, Corbin flat-
ly asserts that 'statutes and rules of law are certainly not incor-
porated into the contract'." 13 5 Finally, Mittenthal contended that
courts apply law to a contract because they exercise the coercive
power of the state; he distinguished arbitrators as exercising no
such power.
132. Id. at 19.
133. Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Labor Arbitration, DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN
AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION 42, 52 (1968). But cf. U.S. Steel Corp., 48 LA 1114 (1967)
where, in disposing of a theft case, Arbitrator Mittenthal initiates a suspiciously Judicial
inquiry into state of mind, intent, admissions by the accused, and the weight of the evi-
dence.
134. Van Huffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 550 (1866). see, e.g.,
Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S.W.2d 686 (1933); Industrial Accident Corrrn'n.
of Colorado v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 64 Colo. 480, 174 P. 589 (1918) (citations by Mitten-
thal).
135. Mitteantal, supra note 133.
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The extremity of the Mittenthal view is shown by his analysis
of national labor policy, oft-cited as a source of support for arbi-
tral activism. He not only asserts that national labor policy does
not support the implication that law is part of the contract, but
continues:
Moreover, because we serve the parties and not the public,
I doubt that national labor policy could in any event be a
sound basis for drawing this implication.
13 6
These arguments have not passed without criticism. Arbitrator
Howlett, addressing the same proceeding, contested the interpreta-
tion of the language from Enterprise Wheel cited by the court in
Hutchings that the arbitrator is limited to the collective bargaining
agreement:
[I]t does not mean that an arbitrator may not, or should
not, apply the law. Quite the contrary! The arbitrator in-
terprets and applies the collective bargaining agreement
within the law. He may believe that men and women
should not be equal in pay and other economic benefits,
but the law is to the contrary-and ought to be applied re-
gardless of the contract language.
13 7
Howlett, having the last word advantage over Mittenthal, also quar-
rels with the conclusion that only courts apply the coercive power
of the state. Citing the Lincoln Mills case he asserts:
Arbitrators also participate in the coercive power of the
state, as both federal and state law provide for enforcement
of arbitrators' awards by courts of competent jurisdiction. 138
An analysis which disputed the dependence of arbitration on the
intent of the parties was presented to the Academy in 1970.- 9 Arbi-
trator Sovern relied on John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,'40 where
a union attempted to enforce a collective bargaining agreement
against Wiley, which had absorbed the company who had negotiated
the contract with the union. In an opinion which found for the union,
Mr. Justice Harlan explained:
136. Mittenthal, supra note 133, at 54.
137. Howlett, The Role of Law in Arbitration: a Reprise, DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN
AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION 64, 67 (1968).
138. Id. at 69.
139. Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal Lawt ARBITRATION AND THE
EXPANDING ROLE OF NEUTRALS 29 (1970).
140. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
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While the principles of law governing ordinary contracts
would not bind to a contract an unconsenting successor to
a contracting party, a collective bargaining agreement is
not an ordinary contract. . . . Central to the peculiar status
and function of a collective bargaining agreement is the fact,
dictated by both circumstances. . .and by the requirements
of the National Labor Relations Act, that it is not in any.
real sense the simple product of a consensual relationship.
Therefore, although the duty to arbitrate. . .must be found-
ed on a contract, the impressive policy considerations favor-
ing arbitration are not wholly overborne by the fact that
Wiley did not sign the contract being construed.1 4 1
Two additional arguments have been voiced on behalf of arbi-
tral activism. First, the cost of arbitration cannot be ignored. Where,
because the arbitrator refuses to consider legal issues that are cen-
tral to the grievance, the controversy must be relitigated, the ex-
pense of the first hearing being essentially wasted. In rebuttal, it
could be argued that merely because the arbitrator considers the
issue is no insurance that it will not be relitigated. However, in
response to a poll of all the members of the Academy, sixty per
cent felt that interpretation of a legal question involved in a dis-
pute would limit the length of litigation between the parties; only
fourteen per cent felt that it would not.142 Secondly, Arbitrator How-
lett argues that where arbitrators refrain from grappling with legal
issues, they not only deny the Board the benefit of their expertise
when the same issue appears before it, but also frustrate the Board's
policy in Speilberg.
The possibility that arbitrators lack the competence to apply
fair employment laws to a grievance remains the most significant
objection to the incorporation of such extraneous law. Meltzer has
observed:
There is, moreover, no reason to credit arbitrators with
any competence, let alone special expertise with respect to
the law, as distinguished from the agreement. A good many
arbitrators lack any legal training at all, and even lawyer
arbitrators do not necessarily hold themselves out as knowl-
edgable about the broad range of statutory and administra-
tive materials that may be relevant in labor arbitration.1 4
141. Id. at 550 (emphasis added),
142. Note, The Authority and Obligation of a Labor Arbitrator to Modify or Eliminate
a Provision of a Collective Bargaining Agreement Because in His Opinion It V olates Fed-
eral Law, 32 Or1 ST. L.J. 395 (1971). The questionnaires were mailed to all members of
the Academy. However, because the arbitrators responded at will, the results axe not
truly random.
143. Meltzer, supra note 131, at 16.
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This contention is born out by the responses of the members of the
Academy to the following question:
Assuming you were authorized to do so, how would you
feel about interpreting the provisions of a collective agree-
ment in accordance with the following statutes. (1) Would
feel competent and expert; (2) Would feel competent; (3)
Would rather avoid; (4) No opinion.'"
For Title VII of the Civil Rights Act the following responses were
returned by non-lawyer and lawyer arbitrators, respectively:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
18% 47% 31% 4%
23% 58% 13% 6%
In comparison with the other ten statutes that were presented,
only the federal anti-trust laws and the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act received lower ratings in the first category. In the
second category, however, Title VII ranked highest.
Even those who advocate judicial deference to arbitration awards
concede the complexities of employment discrimination. Bloch, who
harshly criticized the cases that abrogated the exhaustion of con-
tractual remedies rule for Title VII grievances, states:
Racial discrimination comes in many forms, some so
subtle that even the most experienced arbitrator may be un-
able to define the situation. . . . This is the fundamental
reason for the existence of expert administrative agencies.
. . . Moreover, since the arbitrator is probably not trained
in labor and civil rights law, the potential for error in-
creases.14
5
In an article which compliments arbitrators for their handling of
discrimination policies of the nation they tend to beg off.'1 4 7
Where the arbitrators deal with the cases which are the
grist for the arbitration process; the promotion denied, the
144. Note, supra note 142, at 398.
145. Bloch, supra note 91, at 638. Bloch attempts to mitigate this criticism by arguing
that the arbitrator is competent to operate within the four corners of the agreement.
This leads to the rather anomolous result that the intent of the parties determines
not only the arbitrator's jurisdiction, but also his competence.
146. Blumrosen, Labor Arbitration, EEOC Conciliation, and Discrimination in Enpoy-
ment, 24 ARB. J. 88, 90 (1970).
147. Id. at 92. The author finds comfort in Sligo, Inc., 50 LA 1203 (1968), where Arbi-
trator Dunsford upheld time off for black employees to mour the assassination of Dr.
Martin Luther King, while white employees received no such opportunity.
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lay-off or discharge protested, the working conditions chal-
lenged, their opinions are respectable and workmanlike. 1' 6
Yet, the same author later acknowledges that, "[W]hen arbitra-
tors are asked to go beyond this point in implementing the anti-
discrimination policies of the nation they tend to beg off.1'
The classic example of arbitration gone awry in the Civil Rights
area is Hotel Employers Assn.148 Under the threat of continuing dem-
onstrations, which had already disrupted the San Francisco Hilton,
the Association negotiated an agreement with the NAACP and CORE
in San Francisco. Its purpose was to increase the proportion of
minority hotel employees; its method was a system of beneficient
quotas. In addition to finding that the Association had wrongfully
bypassed the certified bargaining agent, Arbitrator Burns held:
The purpose and effect of the 1966 Civil Rights agree-
ment are to establish a preference for Negroes and other
minority groups. . .and thereby to discriminate against non-
Negroes and those who do not belong to some minority
group. The purpose and effect are unlawful. Discrimination
against any individual. . .because of race. . .is unlawful
under federal law .... 14 9
Arbitrator Burns further showed an unregenerate insensitivity to
racial discrimination by ruling that a statistical analysis of minority
employees by job classification was irrelevant unless used to estab-
lish an unlawful preference for minority workers. Such a ruling
would surprise the EEOC, which frequently requires such statistics.
Appropriately, Platt concludes:
The lesson to be learned from Hotel Employers Assn.,
it seems to me, is that there is a potential for miscalcu-
lation whenever an arbitrator undertakes to decide doubt-
ful legal questions under Title VII instead of leaving them
to the determination of EEOC and the courts. 50
The loss to the grievant through an award which, in addition
to being erroneous, is likely to estop further proceedings because
the arbitrator heard evidence on all the legal issues, but floundered
due to his lack of expertise, would be permanent. Furthermore, a
result which strikes at the very process of arbitration has been sug-
gested by Meltzer, in a response to the Mittenthal paper:
148. Hotel Employees Assn., 4.7 LA 873 (Burns 1966).
149. Id. at 886.
150. Platt, 8upra note 110, at 409.
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Even if distinguished lawyer-arbitrators were selected to
resolve grievances enmeshed with such matters [Title VII]
and chose to speak about them, it is doubtful that they would
have the last word in genuinely difficult cases. Reversal of
their determinations, despite their asserted competence to
make them, would, I believe, be more demeaning to arbitra-
tion than the invalidation of awards on the basis of legal
considerations that arbitrators consider to be beyond their
proper sphere. Furthermore, with respect to such legal is-
sues, judicial review would exceed the limitations appropri-
ate for arbitral determination on the scope of the agree-
ment. Once habituated to comprehensive review, the courts
might be less inclined to self-limitation in the contractual
sphere. 1 1
This survey of secondary authority in labor arbitration has dem-
onstrated, as did the preceding review of the awards themselves,
a split over the propriety of arbitral application of law pertinent
to the grievance but extraneous to the agreement. The commenta-
tors clash primarily over the role that the intent of the parties
should play in the exclusion of extraneous law. The equal number
of authorities on each side and the inability of either camp to cite
any court decision overturning an award because the arbitrator ap-
plied, or failed to apply extraneous law, make it unlikely that any
solution will ever be drawn from such an amorphous concept as
the intent of the parties.
No argument voiced by the commentators is either dispositive
of the broad question of the incorporation of extraneous law, or
especially applicable to the more particular issue of the incorpora-
tion of Title VII concepts. What clearly appears is a significant
number of arbitrators, although probably still a minority, who will
consistently apply pertinent law irrespective of the absence of ex-
press contractual authority. Because of the frequently articulated
concern over arbitral competence in legal matters, any standard of
judicial deference must limit the possibility of basing an estoppel
on an award where an arbitrator settled legal issues that he did
not fully comprehend.
In light of the Ohio State Law Journal poll, it cannot be doubted
that a significant number of arbitrators feel they lack the expertise
to perceive Title VII violations that might lurk in the interstices
of a complex grievance. It is submitted, however, that this fact
neither compels the conclusion that arbitrators should uniformly re-
fuse to decide legal issues nor that courts should automatically al-
low relitigation because of the possible incompetance of the arbi-
151. Meltzer, The Role of Law in Arbitration: Rejoinder, DEvELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN
AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION 58, 63 (1968).
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trator. The growing number of agreements that contain anti-discri-
mination provisions 152 suggests that some arbitrators possess, and
others are acquiring, the requisite expertise in the handling of fair
employment practice grievances. Furthermore, the person most fa-
miliar with the shortcomings of an arbitrator is that arbitrator him-
self; the likelihood of voluntary abstention is considerable.
What is required is a warning to arbitrators, and a standard
for courts, that arbitral competence is a crucial factor in determin-
ing whether an award will estop subsequent proceedings. As has
been suggested, the parties should, as early as their submission,
appraise the arbitrator of their concern over the complexity of the
legal issues, and request that the award contain a full exposition
of the legal issues, and request that the award contain a full ex-
position of the issues that he considered. The latter request would
be similar to that submitted by parties when they anticipate that
the award will have significant precedential value in future inter-
pretations of their contract. Such a submission might crystalize an
arbitrator's reticence into an express disclaimer on legal issues.
If not, the requested exposition should provide a reviewing court
with ample evidence of the arbitrator's competence or lack thereof
from which to infer whether or not the Title VII issues had received
a full hearing.
V. CONCLUSION
This note has examined the question of whether, and if so
under what circumstances, the arbitration of a grievance to final
settlement will bar a suit on the same facts brought in federal
court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The United
States Courts of Appeals have split over this question. The Supreme
Court has not resolved the conflict.
No definitive answer was found among the arguments voiced by
the courts that have considered the deference issue. The decisions
of the NLRB in analogous concurrent jurisdiction cases provide no
support for a blanket rule either favoring or opposing deference.
The Board's requirement that the party who asserts arbitration as
a bar must prove that the arbitrator considered the same issues
on which the Board would have based its ruling provides some
152. Platt, supra note 110, quotes the agreement between Bethlehem Steel and the
United Steelworkers:
It is the continuing policy of the Company and the Union that the provi-
zlons of this Agreement shall be applied to all employees without regard to
race, color, religious creed, national origin or sex. The representatives of the
Union and the Company in all steps of the grievance procedure and in all
dealings between the parties shall comply with this provision.
Id. at 400, n.16.
NORTH DAKOTA LAw REVIEW
guidance. A comparison of the remedies available in arbitration
with those statutorily provided for judicial enforcement of Title VII
disclosed substantial similarity.
Supreme Court cases on the arbitration process, particularly
the Steelworkers trilrogy, include dicta which support both sides of
the controversy. Yet the result of that litigation, that the arbitration
process prevailed over the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, would at least indicate the desirability of a solution
that maximizes the role of arbitration in national labor policy. Fi-
nally, the control exercised by the bargaining representative over
the processing of a grievance cautions against presuming the fair-
ness of the grievance procedure, particularly in light of probable
union hostility toward minority group members.
The propriety of arbitral application of law extraneous to the
collective bargaining agreement has been considered. Again, the
awards diverged on this issue. No dispositive argument was dis-
covered among either the awards or the commentaries. However,
the extent of concern over the competence of many arbitrators to
accurately apply extraneous law is uncontrovertable.
The formulation of a set of standards for controlling judicial
deference to arbitration in the context of a Title VII suit has been
accomplished by Edwards and Kaplan:
(1) the arbitration hearing has been fair and regular;
(2) the union, employer and employee would otherwise be
bound by the decision of the arbitrator under the applicable
collective bargaining contract;
(3) the employee has voluntarily participated in the arbi-
tration proceeding-that is, the employee has not resisted
the union's efforts on his behalf;
(4) the employee has been appraised by the union that a
decision by the arbitrator adverse to his claim may subse-
quently foreclose relief under Title VII;
(5) the employee has been fairly and adequately represented;
(6) the arbitrator has found that the contract proscribes
discrimination as defined by Title VII;
(7) the arbitrator has considered and fully decided the
charge of discrimination under the applicable anti-discrimi-
nation clause;
(8) the employee has been given the option of using his
own counsel to present his case to the arbitrator; and
(9) the arbitrator's decision is not clearly repugnant to the
purposes and policies of Title VII.158
153. Edwards and Kaplan, supra note 52, at 651.
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The analysis in this paper has served more to confirm than to dis-
pute these criteria, and is indebted to the authors for its overall
organization. However, two exceptions must be taken.
First, the interest in arbitration as the preferred vehicle for
dispute settlement does not wane because the contract fails to con-
tain a clause which prohibits discrimination. Hence, where the ar-
bitrator clearly states that he is going beyond the agreement to
apply state and federal fair employment law, relitigation should not
be permitted merely because the contract terms did not themselves
secure Title VII rights. Secondly, even where the contract contains
an anti-discrimination provision, and especially where it does not,
some demonstration of arbitral competence to comprehend and ad-
judicate the Title VII rights should appear in the award as a con-
dition precedent to the finding of an estoppel. Minimally, the award
should include a full exposition of the legal issues from which a
court could readily infer the quality, or lack of quality, of the
arbitrator's analysis.
In conclusion, the endorsement of labor arbitration by the Su-
preme Court, which culminated in Boys Market, must be reiterated.
The possibility of relitigating grievances which involve Title VII
issues presents a significant threat to the continued vitality of that
process. Gould has expressed this sentiment as follows:
Arbitration is an established part of the collective bargain-
ing process. It is vital to insure it is a sound one. New ap-
proaches to the use of arbitration in grievances involving
racial discrimination are needed. For if racial discrimina-
tion cases cannot be heard by arbitrators, the uniformity to
which Vaca has given honor and consideration will be under-
mined by a dual system composed of public and private
routes-the first for racial cases and the second for non-ra-
cial.1 5
4
It is urged that the arbitration process once again needs the
support of the Supreme Court. The Court should grant certiorari at
its earliest opportunity in a case that presents the deference issue.
The Court, in its opinion, should reach beyond the solution of the
controversy to establish a clear set of standards that will insure,
at least in a limited set of circumstances, that final settlement in
arbiration of a grievance which involves Title VII rights cannot
be relitigated through a federal court suit under the Civil Rights
Act.
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